מסמך סודי של המודיעין הסורי חושף: המלצות המודיעין הסורי כיצד להערך לקראת גל ההפגנות בסוריה

14.4.11

הי חברה, ענת קם לא לבד,

אחד הבלוגים הסורים הטובים שיש - http://alazdy.blogspot.com/ פרסם היום מסמך אותנטי של המודיעין הסורי ובו הוא חושף בפרטים את המלצות המודיעין הסורי כיצד משטרו של אסד צריך להתמודד עם גל ההפגנות והמחאה הציבורית שהגיע לסוריה. מסקנות הדו"ח הן מה- 23.3.11.

מסמך סודי של המודיעין הסורי חושף:

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Syrian Arab Republic
General Directorate Of The Intelligence Services
No. / /
Date / /
Without Record / Top Secret


General Directorate Of The Intelligence Services / Top Secret


Detailed Plan for implementation:

Evaluation:


It is imperative to make use of the previous experience in dealing with the hostile Muslim Brotherhood movement, and to learn from the mistakes of the Tunisian and Egyptian regime, especially since they neutralized the power of the army and Republican Guard from the beginning, and allowed media outlets to cover every movement until matters got out of control.


In the detailed plan, things won't get to point where the regime or state is endangered or the current continuation [of rule] is under threat, and the final result will be passage of many tiresome months, and after that the regime emerge more powerful indefinitely.

The miniature security panel consisting of A.S. [likely to be Asef Shawkat], M.N., H.K., A.M., H.M. covered at 23/3/2011 regarding opposition protests and discussed the matter from all its aspects (Security, Economic, Political) and has set the following measures: It is stressed that the treatment of the matter requires shared security-media-political-economic work.

Detailed plan:


The plan depends on three complementary factors: Media [PR], security and field performance, political and economic.


Media/PR Factor:


- Connecting the protests with personalities who are detested among the Syrian public, such as known Saudi and Lebanese personalities [possibly alluding to March 14] and connecting all of them with Zionism and the USA.

There is a plan prepared being prepared by a security cell, which will be introduced/implemented in a suitable, timed way on questionable sites under the name of "Bandar Sultan's plan", which is believable and convincing.


- Intense Media campaign accusing protesters and opponents of subservience to Israel, Saudi Arabia and the USA. In the case of killings, the security cell should repeatedly accuse armed or radical gangs, and claim that the security apparatus and army are contributing to the protection of order, stability and the people.


- Indirect media campaign on TV and privately-owned channels about sectarian strife/disorder, and instilling fear of the Muslim Brotherhood in Christians and Druze, warning them of the reprisals they might face by them if they did not participate in ending the protests. Enlisting the Alawites in the coastal regions so they can defend 'their' regime and lives, which are going to be threatened by Sunni radicalism.


- Instructing some security units in all security agencies to work within Facebook to respond to and disrupt the communication of the opponents, labeling them as opponents of the regime with fake names/nicknames, posting views/opinions which damage the reputation of the opposition, and possibly also exposing 'schemes and plans' hostile to the president and the state.


- Forbidding all media outlets from going to the places of unrest, and punishing anyone broadcasting any news which doesn't serve the state - and not showing any tolerance in this matter.


- In case the opposition manages to take pictures or film any videos, the security cell should prepare scenes from the protests and insert loopholes in them, so they can broadcast on state media and subsequently exposed so as to remove credibility from the films/videos of the opposition

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- When being prevented from providing coverage or intervening, the media often relies on eyewitnesses, and we expect that a few of them would dare to call satellite channels to provide their testimony - therefore it is the responsibility of the 'media/press intelligence' cell to prepare some eyewitnesses from 'professional security agents' to contact satellite channels and provide them with exaggerated testimony, with the prerequisite that it should contain loopholes, so it can be directly exposed in our State Media and also on satellite channels in order to 'damage the credibility of any eyewitnesses'.


- Instructing some members of the people's assembly to respond to the 'opponents' and 'vandalists', and to provide them with some points and specifics on how to respond to them.


- Instructing some personalities from the state apparatus located in the place of the protests to respond to the protesters and 'opponents'.


- In case the protests are too intense and hard to ignore, it is inevitable that the 'opposition' should be turned into local demands specific to the region only.


- Sending a convoy of cars carrying pictures of the president, with the possibility of adding the Syrian flag, with the help of security units, their friends, children of government officials and army officers inside cities, and providing these cars with sirens similar to those equipped on ambulances, to create awe within the spirits of by-passers and residents.


- Inviting some moderates within the opposition to [interviews] on State TV, with the possibility of using 'shaming' and some courtesy to persuade them, for this dilutes their demands and turns them to trivial, simple demands they're asking the president to fulfill for them. This is also useful for creating splits in the protective and opposing factions within the opposition.


- The announcement of strict instructions by the Ministry Of Education to 'warn' schools and pupils about the usage of the Internet and Facebook.


- Instructing some artists loyal to us or 'captured' by us to talk to [people in] the places where the protests are happening or the opposition in accordance to what we provide them with.


About the security cells and field performance:
_______________________________________________
- No tolerance of any harm to the image of the highest symbol [of the state] (possibly referring to the president), because this, if tolerated, will increase the opposition's ability to cross all lines.


- It is expected that the opposition's gatherings will be held in places with high population density in order to draw attention and encourage others to join them, and here it's needed to 'blockade/barricade' and isolate the place as much as possible and to sneak in security units in civilian clothes in between the protesters to create disputes and foil/disperse the gathering as soon as possible, and also to arrest some of the 'vandalists' if needed.


- Instructing the 'Information Security' branch in the administration and in the centre for scientific studies to cooperate with the two mobile phone providers to monitor the cell- and landline phones of some expected and known 'insightful' and opposition personalities.


- Calling and 'summoning' the youth to instill a fear of participation [in the protests] in them, arresting some of them and announcing a 'general conscription' in the armed forces in order to exhaust [the strength] of the youths and activists with visiting the recruitment offices.


- Exhausting the strength of the opponents and symbols of the opposition with lawsuits of all shapes and forms, slandering their moral and religious reputation, and it is possible to use some means prepared specifically for this purpose.


- Forbidding prominent members of the opposition from all travel, regardless of reason.


- Instructing the Military Security branch to monitor all mid- and high-level command in the army, especially Sunni ones.


- In the case of violent confrontations between army units and protesters, it is required to issue a clear order to cease all fire [from the side of the army], with the order not being applicable to trained Security Forces, and units belonging to the 'serba' and 'souda' companies, and to use snipers within these companies in a non-apparent way to prevent the localization of the source of the fire - also to increase cover: There is no problem in killing some units and officers of the army, as this is useful in increasing the animosity of the army towards the protesters.

In any place the protests go out of control:

- Isolation of the place with security and army forces, and cutting off electricity, communications, and internet.

- Arresting some influential personalities from this place, and if the situation is critical - killing them.

- Making use of some smugglers and criminals, flooding the place with them and creating a state of chaos.

- Sending trained security forces in civilian clothing to the place of the protests, who should attempt to convince the protesters of using weaponry against the army and security forces.

- Deploying security forces and units from the 'Serba' and 'Souda' companies with snipers in organized campaigns during the protests, with the number of fatalities not exceeding 20 every time, because this might expose the matter and make a case for outside intervention.

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- Deploying Druze and Christian units/officers in the army to the places of protest and tempting them to defend them selves, also deploying units of the army based in remote regions to prevent cases of refusal, rebellion, or hesitation.

- If a critical or potentially dangerous situation develops, getting everyone to choose between security and stability, or the freedoms they're demanding, and here they will choose their security and safety. This can be implemented with some assassinations [of individuals] belonging to different sects and clans, or detonating some places of worship in regions with intense protests.

Economic factor:

- Planning/Sending out a massive demonstration in favor of the president before his speech in front of the people's assembly, so his speech would be a response to the demands of the masses and nothing more. Strict instructions should be issued here to government institutions, syndicates, unions and schools to gather employees and pupils and issue new slogans/banners to them.


The president's anticipated speech:


- Delaying the speech as much as possible, as this delay is an expression of the state's power and its immunity to the current events - it also contributes to clearing the image and setting the amount of political movement needed. Any change we might be forced to make must be presented as if we were the ones who started it and called for it.


- Giving a picture stable impression of the regime.

Measures that can be presented in the president's speech before the people's assembly:


- Increasing the salary of government and public sector employees after consulting the minister of treasury and putting plans for returning the economic stability with 3 months, especially if this raise might destabilise the current economic interests.

- Promising to create new jobs to distribute among the governorates.

- Lowering the price of some essential goods.


- Partial governmental change and exposure of the corruption of some ministers - this requires one security panel to decide which ministers will be sacrificed.


- Lowering the price of mobile phone calls officially, with the possibility of reclaiming part of the losses through hidden costs.


- Giving personal and public privileges to some Muslim and Christian religious figures who are close to the regime and using them to slander the protesters and the opposition, and asking them to use convincing verses from the Qu'ran or specific Hadiths discouraging them from participating in the current events.


- Sending official figures acceptable to the people to talk with opposition and to ask them to accept the political leadership's attempts to converse with them - some of them will accept immediately, some will accept with reservations, and some will reject the matter entirely. This is useful in creating disputes and splits within the opposition and preventing them from appearing as an effective, monolithic actor which can be influential in the protest movement.


- Responding to some of the Kurdish demands regarding citizenship, but only if that happens in a way that doesn't change anything in the state and society or disrupts the current balances - and this response is only to conscript them and suppress their acceptance of foreign intervention if the opposition protests intensify - for the northeastern region is the only problem in regard to this issue as the other regions are not expect to accept such a thing.


- Instructing Syrian embassies overseas, as well as the foreign ministry to reassure the USA and the European states, and reminding that the Golan front might be susceptible to instability if the radicals succeed and gain control.


- Instructing the Syrian embassy in all states to monitor Syrians and their behavior - the foreign ministry is to act in this matter.


- Preparing security and media teams for implementation as soon as possible and as secretly as possible.


Note: The entirety of the detailed plan is not to be put in the hands of anyone or any team of the operation, but should be split into branches and sections